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ABSTRACT 
 
When a city decides to undertake an Olympic Games, they do so with the notion that hosting the 
Olympics will provide many direct financial benefits to the city in addition to countless other 
indirect benefits. Like many activities, the Summer-Olympic Games tend to be more popular 
when it is warm, and this paper will focus on only the previous five Summer Olympic Games. 
As host cities look to cash in on the Olympic Games popularity, the number of Olympic 
infrastructure projects has skyrocketed, leaving many cities with facilities that cost hundreds of 
millions of dollars to build and nothing to use them for post-Olympics. However, every few 
years' cities continue to compete vehemently to the win the bid for the host city of the next 
Olympic Games. This paper seeks to examine whether the benefits of hosting the Summer 
Olympics are valid and if they are substantially inflated, or non-existent. In part, it will focus on 
the broad economic benefits, the costs associated with it, ‘legacy benefits,' other intangible 
benefits, and the overall net effect of these benefits and costs. This general purpose of this paper 
will be to analyze the previous five Summer Olympic Games and discern whether hosting the 
Summer Olympic Games is a profitable endeavor.  
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
It is a common belief among the general populace that taking on the challenge of being a host 
city for a Summer Olympics Games is an economically smart move. Hosting the Olympics is 
associated with the belief that the buzz of the Olympics will draw in sizeable crowds with a 
considerable number of tourists who will spend money in that city. In addition to this, other 
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direct economic benefits that are often linked to being a host city are the broadcasting revenue 
the city receives, licensing, increased employment, ticket sales to Olympic events, sponsorships, 
increased tax revenues, and greater investment in the host city and country. Furthermore, cities 
experience multiplier effects in which induced spending from tourists, employment increases, 
and overall economic stimulus supplement the direct economic impacts. An overall economic 
indicator of success and growth that will be measured is the Olympics effect on Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), which is the total value of an economy’s output of goods and services. Another 
perceived benefit is an increase in local pride from being a host city which can also translate into 
putting the city ‘on the map.' Hosting the Olympics can put a city ‘on the map’ by increasing 
visibility of the city and its attractiveness, which in turn, leads to more investments in the city 
and country and finally may result in increases in trade. However, these benefits are often 
perceived as greater than they truly are, in addition to a lack of or a complete misunderstanding 
of the costs associated with these benefits. The primary costs associated with host cities are the 
costs of planning, submitting a bid to the IFC, building infrastructure, operational costs, implicit 
costs, opportunity cost, and in some cases a decrease in other forms of tourism (Ricketts, 2012). 
Organizers often overlook these costs, assume unreasonable expectations for these expenses, and 
become so obsessed with the perceived benefits that they believe the benefits will always exceed 
the costs and fail to see the real costs of being a host city for the Olympic Games. While each 
Olympics Games share some of the same benefits and costs, due to the unique nature of the 
Olympics Games, each Games differs slightly in their benefits and costs, and thus, each must be 
examined independently. 
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Methodology:  
Measuring the economic impacts with exact precision is tough as it is challenging to gather data 
on every single dollar of economic benefit received by the host city. Additionally, due to the 
ambiguity of "economic benefits" and "economic costs," many sources cite significantly 
different numbers. Furthermore, intangible benefits such as being ‘put on the map’ can lead to 
more outside investment (attracting businesses) and an increase in trade (Ricketts, 2012). The 
methodology will be conducted through primary-source research whereby a particular set of 
criteria will be evaluated for each city. Each city will be analyzed individually looking at the 
main benefits and costs the city endured, and whether the decision to host the Olympic Games 
can be considered an economic success. Additionally, the induced spending and benefits to the 
city provided will be incorporated into the overall analysis of the success of the host city. Recent 
Olympic Games in various cities have run up enormous bills and cost host cities millions of 
dollars that will never be recouped. In turn, this has prompted the question as to whether it is an 
economically smart, or even feasible decision, to host the Summer Olympic Games.  
This paper will focus on the last five Summer Olympic Games, as follows: 1996 Atlanta 
Olympic Games, 2000 Sydney Olympic Games, 2004 Athens Olympic Games, 2008 Beijing 
Olympic Games, and 2012 London Olympic Games. Furthermore, this paper will analyze only 
the Summer Olympic Games for purposes of comparability as the Winter Games, and Summer 
Games do not share the same type of attraction. The Summer Games are typically a larger 
magnet resulting in considerably different benefits and costs. Moreover, it is beneficial to 
analyze the five most recent Summer Olympic Games due to the extensive amount of data 
available, the fact that the modern Olympic Games are a larger spectacle than in the past, and the 
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ability to compare dollar amounts is easier as inflation plays a smaller role. While a great deal of 
research has been conducted on specific Olympic Games and specific benefits and costs of the 
Olympic Games, none attempt to examine the entirety of the most significant benefits and costs 
over a 20-year period across multiple host cities.  
 
This paper will seek to accurately perform a cost/benefit analysis on the direct and induced 
economic benefits of hosting the Summer Olympic Games, revealing the actual benefits and 
costs associated with hosting the Olympic Games. The organizing committees of potential host 
cities fail to recognize the true financial strain that hosting the Olympic Games can have. If 
organizing committees, public officials and city residents could understand the real burden of 
hosting the Olympic Games, and the economic strain it can cause, it is likely that fewer cities 
would be submitting bids to be Olympic Games host cities. This is not to say that economic 
benefits are the only factor is deciding to be a host city. Some cities may decide that even if the 
economic (tangible) costs exceed the economic (tangible) benefits, that the legacy benefits 
(intangible) make it worthwhile to be a host city. 
 
BACKGROUND 
Economic Benefits of Hosting  
Hosting the Summer Olympic Games can have several economic benefits associated with the 
city such as ticket sales, licensing, increased employment, broadcast revenue, sponsorships, and 
increased tourism. The largest sources of revenue for host cities is typically derived via 
broadcasting revenue or through sponsorships, with ticketing and licensing bringing in 
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considerably less (Baade & Matheson, 2016). The impact of tourism is particularly difficult to 
accurately quantify, given that it is impossible to collect information on how every single tourist 
spent their money.  Also, some of the increased tourism cash flow merely represents substitute 
spending or a ‘crowding out’ effect that would have otherwise occurred in a different segment of 
the tourism industry (Owen, 2005). The economic benefits will be significantly impacted by the 
size of the investment into the Olympics, as the hypothetical best case scenario involves a 
massive influx of tourism, active promotion of the city and country, and a sizeable injection of 
direct revenues and taxes into the city and country. 
 
Intangible Benefits of Hosting  
Intangible benefits, also known as legacy benefits, are simply subjective benefits that are unable 
to be measured in monetary terms. The different types of legacy benefits that come from hosting 
the Summer Olympics are things such as the long-lasting infrastructure that has potential to be 
used for many years into the future. In addition, hosting the Olympic Games sends a signal to the 
world that raises the stature of both the host city and the nation on a global stage (Ricketts, 
2012). This intangible benefit comes in the form of increased media presence which in turn can 
lead to a long-term increase in tourism and in attracting new businesses. The Federal Reserve 
Bank of San Francisco suggests that hosting the Olympic Games sends a signal of trade 
liberalization to the world and ultimately results in greater trade activity in the long term. It is 
also suggested that this signal to the world also leads to long-term benefits in tourism, human 
capital, urban regeneration, and reputation. Furthermore, it is impossible to quantify benefits 
such as an increased sense of civic pride within the host city and nation, but these are certain 
benefits that are considered when deciding whether to submit a bid to host. 
  
7 
 
Costs of Hosting  
The costs associated with hosting the Olympic Games begins far before actual preparation for the 
games and starts with the bidding process which takes place seven years before the Olympic 
Games. Cities that interested in hosting the Olympic Games must create a National Organizing 
Committee (NOC) and submit a reasonable bid to the International Olympic Committee (IOC). 
The first-round applications fee alone per city was $100,000 in which eight cities applied for; 
four teams were then chosen to advance to the second round, in which they were required to pay 
an additional $500,000 fee. New York City officials estimated that their bidding process would 
amount to $13 million (Burton, 2003). Per the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, "Interested 
cities spend up to $100 million to "woo" the delegates of the International Olympic Committee 
(IOC) to vote for their city." Once a city has been chosen by the IOC, the host city must begin 
spending capital to construct the massive amount of infrastructure required for new venues and 
to the Olympic Village (Ricketts, 2012). Additional infrastructure costs may arise from needing 
to make improvements to existing infrastructure in the host city such as roads, bridges, sewer 
systems, cleanup, etc. resulting in hundreds of millions and upwards of billions of dollars being 
spent to host the Olympic Games. The final cost of infrastructure is impacted significantly by the 
host cities current infrastructure, the willingness of private investors to invest money into 
Olympic facilities, and the government's inclination towards investing in Olympic projects. This 
represents an investment by the government in the hope that the revenues brought in by the 
Olympic Games can exceed the cost to host them. This investment, however, is funded by either 
increasing taxes or cutting spending on other government programs, resulting in lost opportunity 
costs as that money could have been spent on things such as healthcare, education, and charity. 
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Another opportunity cost many cities fail to realize is that construction for Olympic venues 
‘crowds out’ other construction projects in the local economy. Additionally, cities often create 
organizing committees for the Games which are tasked staging the games, but not necessarily 
large infrastructure projects. These committees still are responsible for most of the direct revenue 
brought in as well as the direct costs. Furthermore, maintenance of Olympic facilitates and the 
lost benefits of not utilizing them in the post-games period is costly (PWC Report, The economic 
impact of the Olympic Games, 2004). All of this, in turn, leads to many host cities experiencing 
cost overrun, which is the increase in total cost due to unexpected costs incurred more than 
budgeted amounts due to underestimation when preparing the budget. Furthermore, additional 
costs that must be considered are operational costs, ceremony costs, medical service costs, food 
costs, transportation costs, security cost, promotion, administration, among many ‘other’ costs 
(Kang, 2008).   
 
1996 Atlanta Olympics  
Economic Benefits  
Preceding the 1996 Summer Olympic Games the official report of the Games mentions Atlanta 
as showing higher interest in social sustainability with equality and equitable being two of the 
driving factors. The Olympics were viewed as the key revitalizing the city with excess money 
being put into fixing up the city and jump-starting the economy (Minnaert, 2012). Total direct 
revenue per the Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games (ACOG) was $1.72 billion, however, 
this was a likely understatement of their true expenditures which likely reached nearly $2.6 
billion, with the top contributors being: broadcasting rights of $568 million, joint ventures of 
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$426 million, ticket sales of $425 million, merchandising revenues of $31 million, and 
sponsorship revenue of $81 million. Atlanta is an exception in that their Olympic Games were 
not highly unprofitable for the city, resulting in an estimated economic impact to the Atlanta area 
of $5.14 billion (Newman, 2004). This $5.1 billion is generated through $2.6 billion of ACOG’s 
expenditures and another $2.5 billion from spending by out of state visitors (Humphreys & 
Plummer, 1995). Regarding direct earnings, the Atlanta Olympic Games produced $1.91 billion 
total which correlated with an employment increase of 77,026 jobs. Of the $1.91 billion in direct 
spending, over half was earned by households, business services, lodging & amusement, retail 
trade, and eating and drinking. The 77,206 jobs added to the economy consisted primarily of 
lodging and amusements, eating and drinking. These numbers simply reflected estimates and 
best guesses at the time, and while current studies show that the actual number of jobs was 
roughly half of the estimate, and only leading to 2,472 permanent full or part-time jobs added, 
the temporary employment increase was a significant factor in the 1996 Olympic Games Success 
(Baade & Matheson, 2002). Private investment was stimulated in the Atlanta area with 7,500 
hotel rooms being built to accommodate the influx of tourists. Additionally, the $1.7 billion 
privately-funded investment in Centennial Park and other areas of downtown Atlanta brought 
increased attention to the area and more investments in surrounding housing, hotels, restaurants, 
etc. (Glanton, 2009). Concerning tourism, it seems that the Olympic Games created a short-term 
spike in tourism that benefited from the Olympic legacy. Many restaurants, bars, hotels, and 
other businesses in Atlanta benefited greatly from the games to the tune of $14.7 billion tourist 
dollars spent in Georgia in 1996. Foreign direct investment into the city increased mildly 
following the Olympics, increasing from a growth rate of 7.7% in 1993, rising to 12.5% in 1994, 
before falling to 10.6% during the Games year and 7.9% the following year (Kang, 2008).  
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Regarding overall GDP, hosting the games did not have a significant impact on Atlanta other 
than a modest increase in the years before and after. While many industries experience 
significant growth before the Olympics, their aggregate is still insignificant when comparing to 
the total GDP of a city or country (PWC Report, The economic impact of the Olympic Games, 
2004) However, while the Olympics did put Atlanta on the international map, it was short lived 
as it did not solve many of the underlying issues Atlanta, most notably their convention centers 
were too small to accompany big business. Other problems that plagued the city were a lack of 
entertainment and a variety of urban issues that caused Atlanta to be viewed as a boring city, 
unable to attract tourists and businesses (Engle, 1999).  
Economic Costs 
The total expenses for staging the games incurred per Atlanta Committee of Olympic Games 
(ACOG) were $1.72 billion, with the top five values being: construction, technology, host 
broadcasting, Olympic Village, and transportation (ACOG, 1996). A 2001 report from the 
United States General Accounting Office corroborates with earlier ACOG cost estimates and 
postulates that ACOG staging costs were $2.4 billion, with the cost being slightly higher than 
planners anticipated. This $2.4 billion in staging costs was funded mainly with $2 billion in 
ACOG revenues, another $234 million from the local government, and the final $193 million 
coming from the Federal Government (GAO, 2001).  These expenses include all those incurred 
by ACOG, further direct capital costs would mount much higher to $4.1 billion and a total cost 
overrun of 151% per the Oxford Olympics Study 2016 (Flyvbjerg, Stewart, & Budzier, 2016). 
The post-staging game costs were financed almost entirely by private funds with nearly 85% of 
the funding coming from Coca-Cola alone (Zhao, 2010).  A smart move by Atlanta was to house 
the athletes in student halls rather than build entire Olympic villages from the ground up. 
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Additional factors in keeping costs down for the 1996 Olympic Games was the massive 
commercialization of the games (Applebome, 1996). Supplementary capital was required for the 
Atlanta Olympic Legacy initiative, coming from the government in the form of a $500 million 
bond funded by the taxpayers that would cover security, improvements to local housing projects, 
improvements to infrastructure, construction of local pieces of art, and improvements to public 
transportation (Glanton, 2009). 
 Analysis and Inference 
Overall, hosting the 1996 Summer Olympics seems to have been a modest economic success. 
ACOG generated a significant amount of direct revenue, and, regarding additional positive 
economic benefits, Atlanta prospered by most measures of economic success. Atlanta produced 
an impressive amount of direct spending into the city and state and created many jobs in addition 
to this. One of the most prominent lasting successes of the 1996 Olympics, Centennial Olympic 
Park, is one of Atlanta’s most popular parks and is teeming with activity. Beyond Centennial 
Olympic Park, the $500 million bond allowed for infrastructure upgrades, a long-needed airport 
expansion, improvements in public transportation, and improvements in public housing projects. 
The results of the activity generated from this bond are Atlanta landmarks such as Turner Field, 
the Georgia State University Olympic Village Housing Complex, the Georgia Tech Swimming 
and Diving Center, among countless other beneficial projects. The area around the park is flush 
with recent developments with major hotels, condo’s, and offices that continue to keep the area 
alive with economic activity (Bazemore, 2011). While the city did experience cost overrun, the 
net total economic benefit to Atlanta and the surrounding region is undoubtedly positive.   
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2000 Sydney Olympics  
Economic Benefits 
Like the hope Atlanta had to revitalize their city, Sydney was hoping that the magnitude of the 
Olympics would be enough that it would have a positive economic impact on Sydney, and 
Australia. Studies done by professional services firms such as KPMG significantly overestimated 
the economic benefits to the city, especially in the expected future earnings coming from new 
infrastructure. The Sydney Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games (SOCOG) reported 
direct revenues of A$2.83 billion which was comprised mainly of broadcasting rights, ticket 
sales, sponsorship, and government funding. Another organizing committee, the Olympic Co-
Ordination Authority (OCA) reports similar revenues to SOCOG with total operating revenue of 
A$2.86 billion. These revenues are primarily made up from broadcasting rights of A$1.32 
billion, A$730 million from sponsorships, A$356 million in ticket sales, and A$174 million in 
the form of merchandise sales (Giesecke & Madden, 2011). The overall economic impact has 
been estimated between A$6.0-A$6.5 billion (PWC Drexel Study). The most likely scenario for 
real foreign direct investment induced by the Olympics is a 1.351% increase in New South 
Wales (NSW) and a 0.51% increase in real investment in all of Australia in the pre-Games phase 
with diminishing returns during the Game year and post-Games years. Sydney expected both an 
increase in foreign investments made resulting from their increased world presence and an 
increase in domestic investment related to the Olympics in expectation of residual returns (NSW 
Office of Financial Management, Research and Information Paper, 1997). Foreign investment 
rose from 2.6% in 1995 to 14.1% in 1998 in preparation for the games before falling to 1.3% 
during the Games year and falling temporarily -1.3% in 2001 before again rising to 15.3% in 
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2002. (Kang, 2008). While foreign investment did not increase significantly following the 2000 
Olympic Games, this is most likely due to the economic downturn Australia went through in the 
early 2000s, and the Olympics likely played a small role in this (Kang, 2008).  Concerning other 
economic indicators, employment grew in the years leading up to the Olympics and swelled to a 
15,600 increase in jobs at the peak and an increase in 5,300 jobs from the period 1994-2006 
(Arthur Andersen, 1999). Most of these were low skill jobs in construction, transportation, 
personal services, and hospitality. In the year 2000 Sydney reported nearly 8.7 million tourists, 
an increase of 8.7% from 1999 in which Sydney had 8 million visitors. Additionally, in the post-
games years, Sydney reported 8.66 million and 8.6 million tourists in 2001 and 2002 
representing only a 0.5% decrease from the games year (Kang, 2008).  Australia saw an increase 
of Olympic visitors of two million in the pre-Olympics phase and a stark increase of 14.9 million 
Olympic visitors in 2000. Concerning GDP, New South Wales experienced a 0.437%, 1.156%, 
and 0.152% increase in the years preceding, the year of, and the years after hosting the Olympic 
games (Madden & Crowe, 2005) 
Economic Costs 
In 2000, the Auditor-General of New South Wales concluded that the Sydney Games a total of 
A$6.0-A$6.5 billion, with the total cost to the public coming in somewhere between A$1.7 and 
A$2.4 billion. The net impact on the budget of NSW Government was a cost of A$1.326 billion, 
calculated via total Olympic costs of A$6,484 funded via A$4,447 from SOCOG, the Sydney 
Paralympic Organizing Committee (SPOC), the Commonwealth government, and the private 
sector. Additional tax revenue generated from the Olympics in addition to foreign exchange 
gains added another A$711 million to the funding of Olympic costs to the NSW government 
budget {[(6,484) + 4,447 + 711] = 1,326}. SOCOG total expenses of A$2.90 billion exceeded 
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their revenues of A$2.84 billion by A$59.8 million, and this was covered through government 
funding (Auditor-General’s Report AUS, 2002). SOCOG costs were comprised chiefly from 
operating expenses of A$746 million, technology costs of A$407 million, administration and 
marketing costs of A$291 million, Games services costs of A$261 million, and communication 
costs of A$250 million.  Total costs of venues and facilities reached A$3.03 billion, A$3.46 
billion was spent on event-related expenses, another A$102 million for transportation and 
security, as well as all future maintenance costs associated with venues. Due to these high 
maintenance costs, many of the venues constructed in Sydney Olympic Park failed in the years 
following the Olympics as the venues failed to meet expected bookings and target revenues 
(Auditor-General’s Report AUS, 2002). The investment into infrastructure was a massive 
expense for Sydney as the government invested A$350 million into upgrading the Sydney 
airport, another A$500 million on highway renovations and Olympic Village (among other 
projects) helping stimulate further economic development (Zhao, 2010). Total operating and 
event-related expenses incurred by SOCOG, SPOC, and other support services totaled A$3.46 
billion.  The Oxford Olympics study done in 2016 estimates that Sydney experienced cost 
overrun of 90% costing the city $5 billion in 2015 US dollars. In addition, to free up capital in 
the years preceding the Olympic Games, the government shifted money from healthcare and 
education to prepare for the games (Berlin, 2003).  
Analysis and Inference  
For the most part, it appears hosting the Olympics had a modest positive net impact estimated 
around A$6 billion for Sydney and Australia. Estimates from the Auditor-General of New South 
Wales reports that the direct (negative) economic impact on the budget of NSW for hosting the 
Olympics was –A$1.326 billion and that economic growth was not stimulated to the extent that 
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pre-games economic impact studies showed. However, the games brought in a sizeable amount 
of direct revenue into the city in addition to an increase in temporary employment and tourism, 
in tune to nearly A$6.5 billion in total economic impact. However, with a minimum of $5 billion 
in total costs to stage the games and operate the games, the years of maintenance required on the 
newly constructed venues, the Sydney Olympics were certainly costly. Also, while some of the 
Olympic venues have been restructured for continuing use, many of the extremely expensive 
venues such as equestrian centers, softball compounds, and human-made rapids have not been 
used as much as expected, and these losses were unable to be recouped in many cases. 
Furthermore, had Sydney not invested so much into the Olympics they could have used that 
money for other expenses such as building/repairing infrastructure, money for health care, 
money for education, etc.   
 
2004 Athens Games 
Economic Benefits 
In preparation for hosting the games the Greeks spared no expense as the Olympics were 
returning to Athens for the first time since 1896, and Athens opportunity at reinventing its image. 
Clearly, the history involved played a large role in the Greeks decision to create an Olympics 
that signified the importance of the values of the Olympic Movement. Support for hosting the 
Olympics was widespread as 90% of the population supported hosting the Games; however, the 
public was not well educated on the true expenses of hosting the Olympic Games. Laying the 
groundwork for the Olympics included 62 work sites, which included 22 directly related to the 
Olympics and 40 works related to non-competition venues which were built to improve traffic 
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flow, reduce environmental problems, improve city infrastructure in a bad city districts, and 
increase the quality of life for all inhabitants and offer new opportunities for citizens after the 
games have passed. There was a general feeling that the hosting the Olympics presented an 
opportunity to improve the state of the country seriously. Per the Official Report of the XXVII 
Olympiad the ATHOC produced total direct revenues of €2.0984 billion which consisted mostly 
from broadcasting revenues of €579 million, sponsorships of €537 million, ticket sales of €194 
million, financial revenues of €226 million, licensing revenues of €120 million, as well as Greek 
State Participation contributing another €283 million. ATHOC concluded its operations as a 
company in 2005 with a surplus of €130.6 million, of which €123.6 million wet to the Greek 
State to cover other related expenses, resulting in a net profit of ATHOC of €7 million. The total 
economic impact of the games between 2005 and 2016 is estimated to be €6.5 billion, with most 
of this benefit coming during the preparation of the Games. Foreign investment into Athens and 
Greece rose from 9.7% in 2002 to 14.7% in 2003 as the Games approached, and dropped to 7.7% 
during the Games-year and 2.4% in 2005 (Kang, 2008). The additional capital provided by the 
incremental increase in tax revenue amounted to billions from the increase in economic activity 
around the greater Athens area. These additional tax revenues were used to fund programs of the 
Greek State. Furthermore, with the large investment in infrastructure, this created a significant 
temporary increase in the labor sector with several jobs being created mainly in the construction 
industry and the hospitability and tourism industry, with many other induced jobs being created. 
The Olympic Committee of the Olympic Games officially employed 14,056 individuals during 
the entire pre-to-post Olympic Games period, with most of these being low paying service jobs. 
Another increase in labor sector came in the journalism industry as many media companies 
temporarily increased staff for the games to handle the vast increase in Olympic Games coverage 
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desired, with many of these jobs requiring formal educations. Statistics show that hosting the 
Games temporarily reduced the Greek unemployment rate from 11.2% to 9.7% from 2000-2003 
in preparation for the games, however in 2004 unemployment rose again back to 10.5% 
(Panagiotopoulou, 2014). More explicitly, the greater Athens area which had an unemployment 
rate of 12% from 1996-2000 experienced even superior employment gains than Greece as 
Athens unemployment rate dropped from 12% to 8.54% in 2003, before increasing again in 2004 
to 9.3%. Another meek achievement the Greeks achieved was an increase in the number of 
tourist arrivals in the period 2003-2007 from 3,034,913 million to 3,872,156 million, before 
beginning to decline again 2008 due to the Greek economic crisis and several other factors 
(Panagiotopoulou, 2014). Greece was only able to entice €1 billion in foreign investments, 
almost completely through the security industry. In addition to this, the GDP growth rate of 
Athens fell rose 9.1% during the pre-games phase before leveling off to 7.7% growth during the 
Games and post-games (Kang, 2008). The final benefit that the city of Athens and the country of 
Greece received was a re-emergence of recognition of Athens as a world class city. This increase 
in perception of Greece was short lived however as the impending economic crisis would leave a 
colossal stain on the world's picture of Greece.   
Economic Costs 
The final costs for the 2004 Athens Olympic Games are often disputed and are vastly different 
depending on the source you are using. Most studies and sources agree that the final cost of the 
games cost ranged from a likely €8.468 billion to €13.1 billion, far exceeding the original budget 
of a minimum of €4.602 billion by 25% (Panagiotopoulou, 2014). This €8.468 billion is 
validated by a November 2004 report from the Ministry of Finance detailing the Olympic 
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funding sources as €6.2 billion from the Public Investment Programme, €0.6 was the cost of the 
state budget between 2000-2004, and another €1.8 was given to ATHOC, totaling €8.6 billion. 
The Games were funded mostly via the Greek State Budget (Public Investment Program & 
Ordinary Budget) and ATHOC revenues, with a smaller amount coming from the Worker’s 
Housing Organization and the private sector (Karatassou, 2015). The total expenditure by the 
Greek State range from €6 billion to €7.2 billion spent on Olympic works, sporting facilities, and 
security. Furthermore, the Ministry of Finance disbursed another €1.6 billion for construction 
costs related to Olympic venues. In preparation for the 2004 Games Athens, among other Greek 
cities, underwent significant infrastructure upgrades. Many investments by the Greek State had 
to be increased as the cost estimation in early years was drastically underestimated, and new 
investments had to be made to finish construction of projects.  Massive state of the art athletic 
facilities, new roads, Olympic Village, and public transportation upgrades. ATHOC as a 
company reported total overall expenditures of €1.968 billion, with most of the difference going 
to the Greek State. Furthermore, the costs of the Games were substantially inflated due to the 
“Greece 2004” initiative set forward by the Greek government and was included in the Olympics 
projects category. Many of these projects included renovation and reconstruction of facilities that 
were not directly related to the Olympic Games but would benefit the citizens of Greece. Of the 
nearly €8.5 billion in costs roughly €6 billion was covered through Greek State expenditures 
(Karatassou, 2015).  This €6 billion is comprised primarily of infrastructure, security costs, and 
the Greece 2004 Program. The other €2.5 was contributed via €1.968 billion from ATHOC and 
$380 million from private investments. The major costs ATHOC bore were technology, 
operational and support costs, administration services, logistics, marketing, and expenditures for 
the Paralympic Games. It is also important to consider the opportunity costs such as investment 
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into healthcare, education, and private investment associated with the Games. It is estimated that 
hosting the Olympics created an opportunity cost of 0.2% of GDP. Had Greece forgone hosting 
the Olympics and instead invested money elsewhere, the funds could have potentially yielded 
much more economic benefit for the Greek economy (Karatassou, 2015). Another opportunity 
cost Athens faced was the loss of valuable city real estate. Many of the facilities and venues used 
for the Athens Games now lay dormant and unused, a landmark to the economic mismanagement 
of the 2004 Olympic Games. Some studies have concluded that cost overrun of 49% and 
associated debt of the Olympic Games played a role in exacerbating the Greek economic crisis 
that began in 2007 (Flyvbjerg, Stewart, & Budzier, 2016). 
Analysis and Inference  
Hosting the Olympic Games was a rash decision undertaken by the city of Athens and the Greek 
economy. While the Games did bring a surge of revenue into the city and country, it was not 
even close to enough to offset the massive infrastructure costs as the cost overrun ran at 49%, 
which while not horrible, is extremely significant when talking about billions of dollars. The 
games were important regarding promoting the city of Athens and the country of Greece, 
signaling to the world that they are a first-class country capable of handling mega-events such as 
the Olympics. However, the capability to host mega events is not necessarily correlated with 
significant economic benefits. Athens and the Greek State spent a colossal amount of money on 
improving the cities infrastructure for both Olympic and non-Olympic projects such as “Greece 
2004”, much of which cost more than initial estimates as planners and engineers were rushed 
into finishing the facilities. While this may be feasible in countries with larger economies of 
scale, access to more tax revenue, and the infrastructure already in place, it is not a sensible 
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decision for smaller economies such as Greece. Nonetheless, there were positive economic 
benefits, including the €2.9 billion the Greek State received in the form of tax revenues and 
social security contributions because of increased commercial activity and employment. ATHOC 
also had a positive operating income of €131 million, of which all but €7 million went back to 
the Greek State. Certainly, hosting the games was beneficial in the actual years of the games as it 
raised GDP in those years, lowered the unemployment rate, and brought an influx of revenue 
into the city and government. Conversely, because Athens was not able to find a way to utilize 
their lavish Olympic facilities after the Games this lead to a net decrease in GDP of 0.2% in the 
years following the Olympics and leading into the Greek recession.  
 
2008 Beijing Games 
Economic Benefits  
After winning the bid to host the Olympics, China began a massive undertaking of revitalizing 
Beijing’s infrastructure that would last seven years and was an opportunity for Beijing to present 
themselves as a major world player. Like other Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea, 
China hoped the Olympics would help establish the perception of them as world power 
economically, socially, and politically (Sands, 2008). The Beijing Olympic Games Organizing 
Committee (BOCOG) was tasked with staging the games, including the building of massive 
infrastructure projects. BOCOG shows direct revenues of $1.625 billion comprised of 
broadcasting rights of $709 million, licensing/sponsorships of $330 million, ticket sales of $140 
million, government subsidies of $100 million, and another $100 million coming from national 
and municipal governments (Brunet & Xinwen, 2008). The GDP growth rate of China grew to 
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14.2% in 2007 due to the increase in investment, construction projects, and other Olympic 
projects, which was the country’s highest GDP in a decade. Additionally, the China Daily reports 
that the increase in GDP contributable to the Olympics is negligible, and is likely only adding 
one percent of growth (Trofimovskaya, 2012). The annual growth of GDP in Beijing has been 
over 10% for many years, and the one percent increase brought by the Olympic activity is not 
significant to overall GDP. Per BOCOG, the investments related to the Beijing Games totaled 
$14.257 billion dollars with most of the investments going towards environmental protection 
(60.5%), transportation (25.8%), and Olympic sports facilities (10%) with 85% coming from 
public investment and the other 15% being financed privately (Brunet & Xinwen, 2008). 
However, later studies indicate that the final investments may have been as high as $38billion 
(Khan, 2010). Nevertheless, these investments have produced positive returns such as Beijing's 
new wastewater treatment plants, solid waste processing facilities, reduced reliance on coal, oil, 
and other resources, enormous investments in renewable energy, and other green initiatives will 
benefit Beijing and China for years to come. The investment seems to have had a positive impact 
on net economic growth due to the substantial investment in information technology, banking, 
and the services sector. Furthermore, the Beijing Games have fast-tracked their increase in 
foreign investment, investment in Chinese realty, foreign ideas, and globalization (Sands, 2008). 
Investment into Beijing increased from 3.3% in 2001 to 5.2% in 2003, before falling to 3.9% in 
the games year and 2.3% the following year (Trofimovskaya, 2008). In preparation for the 
Games, Massive investment is meant to stimulate the economy, and the citizens are supposed to 
benefit from this in the form of increased employment and better government services. Jobs in 
Beijing and China steadily grew in the pre-Games years leading to an increase of 2,788 
permanent full or part-time jobs. Total employed persons within relevant industries rose 
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significantly leading up to the Olympics.  This was stimulated by a five year period of 
employment growth in the construction, high-tech, modern manufacturing, social services, and 
agricultural industries. Overall, the Olympics injected a significant amount of direct revenue into 
Beijing and raised the profile of the city leading to an increase in foreign investment.  
 
Economic Costs 
 
Little information exists on the true costs of the Beijing Olympics and final costs range anywhere 
from $6.8 billion to $44 billion, making it, by far, the costliest Olympic Games ever. The Oxford 
Olympics Study estimates that Beijing cost $6.8 billion and caused cost overrun of 2%.  The 
official BOCOG report shows virtually no figures or totals in their finance chapter of their 
Olympic Charter, however, likely estimates of ~$20-$44 billion in total expenditures, with most 
of this going towards Olympic sports facility projects, operational costs, ceremony expenses, and 
administration expenses is realistic (Hashmi, Fida, & Alhaky, 2008). A 2009 report from the 
Chinese National Audit Office states that BOCOG expenditures total $2.74 billion (CN¥19.54 
billion) with broadcasting, accommodation, medical and transport services being the largest 
BOCOG expenditures. The most substantial costs were in the form of government investment, 
with the little help from corporate underwriters, into massive infrastructure projects like the $500 
million ‘Bird’s Nest’ or a $3 billion terminal with many of these facilities left unused following 
the Olympics (Fowler, 2008). An additional $1.1 billion was needed for transportation and 
infrastructure improvements, $200 million for urban renewal, and $3.6 billion for technology. 
Corporate sponsorship and investment proved to be $2.1 billion Indirect investment by the 
Chinese government into environmental protection and transportation cost $18.675 billion and 
direct investment from the Chinese government into things like Olympic facilities as well as 
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basic construction added another $17.506 billion. While this may seem extremely expensive, it 
was somewhat offset by the fact that China had a GDP of $4.52 trillion in 2008, meaning that 
even if the highest estimates are correct at the cost of $44 billion, it still is only less than 1% of 
the country’s GDP. This still raises the issue of opportunity costs, however, as this money could 
have been put towards education, healthcare, human’s rights programs, or social-welfare 
programs as China is notoriously lagging in those areas. Furthermore, in anticipation of 4.5 
million tourists spending $4.5 billion in 2008, with 550,000 of those visitors coming to the 
Games, Beijing experienced a boom in hotels built with an increase of 64-174 four and five-star 
hotels, adding 9,739 rooms. However, a strict Chinese policy on foreigners with Visas as led to 
an ensuing decrease in tourists. The growth in visitor numbers had been rising around 6% 
steadily up until March 2008, but by April the number of visitor numbers was 2% lower than the 
previous year,   and it continued to fall until the number of visitors was 5% less than last years 
which correlated to 6 and 14 million fewer tourists. Beijing fared worse than China and had 30% 
fewer visitors in July 2008 as for July 2007 and an overall drop of 18% fewer tourists in 2008 
than in 2007 (Beijing Olympic Update, European Tour Operators Association, 2009). However, 
it is important to consider the fact that other Asian countries experienced similar declines in 
tourism during this time and this was in the early years of the Great Recession in the United 
States. Another significant cost the city of Beijing faced was the issue of forced evictions, while 
although they have occurred in China for many years, was notably worse preceding the 2008 
Beijing Games. In preparation for the games many densely populated neighborhoods were 
cleared away and comprehensively torn down in order free up urban space for new infrastructure 
projects and housing developments for higher income earners. The Center on Housing Rights 
and Evictions estimated that 1.5 million Chinese citizens were forced out their homes in Beijing, 
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many times with zero or at best inadequate compensation, while the Chinese government 
continues to claim only 6,000 families were relocated and every family received adequate 
compensation (Blanchard, 2008).  
 
Analysis and Inference  
Reaching a conclusion on the relative success of the Olympics is tough for Beijing, and for 
China. With an approximate price tag of $44 billion, it is likely the most expensive summer 
Olympics Games ever held in addition to social, political, and opportunity costs. While this is 
somewhat offset by the massive economic output of China, it is still billions of dollars that could 
have been better spent. However, the Beijing Games received an unprecedented amount of media 
coverage and sponsor presence than any other Olympics before, putting them "on the map." In 
addition to this, the massive amount of money invested by the Chinese government helped in 
cleaning up the environment in and around Beijing, created a more modern city, and led to vast 
improvements in transportation. BOCOG reported a net income of $19 million, but this is widely 
disputed by other sources, meaning they likely lost money. Some economic growth can be 
attributed to the Beijing Games as almost 3,000 new permanent full or part-time jobs were 
created, foreign investment increased, and the city was modernized. The Beijing Games can also 
be credited with creating new jobs, injecting revenue into the city. Additionally, the games seem 
to have had an adverse impact on tourism in Beijing and China as the number of visitors to those 
areas decreased significantly in 2008 from 2007. This reduction in tourists can be partly 
attributed to a strict visa policy, and a crowding out effect in which many people believed the 
Olympics would create such a crowd that they did not travel at all. Though the Beijing Games 
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did bring several economic benefits, it is difficult to argue that the massive amount of money 
spent and the human’s right violations that occurred were offset by the benefits the city received.  
 
2012 London Games 
Economic Benefits  
In 2003, the mayor of London at the time, Ken Livingstone, promised that London’s hosting of 
the 2012 Olympics would bring the single biggest transformation to the city since the Victorian 
Age (Monks Kieron, 2016). The Olympics were seen by London as a chance to revitalize East 
London, which was notorious for being the most neglected, and poverty-stricken area of London. 
Because the London Olympic Games took place so recently in 2012, there is a sharp contrast to 
the lack of available economic data surrounding the event. London, like other Olympic host 
cities, has claimed that their investment into the Olympics paid off. The British Government 
produced a substantial five-year, 1000-page report prepared by a team of respected consultants. 
The report claims that Britain had earned at least $16 billion from the Games, with the future 
forecasts indicating that Britain would receive tens of billions of dollars from hosting the 2012 
Olympic Games in London. A government-sponsored report was prepared by the professional 
services firm Grant Thornton that brings into the question of the validity of the report, in addition 
to the constant reassurances from Business Secretary Vince Cable (Shapiro, 2014). London 
enjoyed moderate success in attracting Olympic tourists, with more than 3 million overseas 
visitors coming to Britain in August 2012. The 590,000 Olympic specific visitors spent an 
average of £1,290 while visiting, compared to £650 for the average visitor (Telegraph Staff, 
2012). This success, however, was still a five percent decrease in total visitors in London from 
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the prior year. Per a report from the Economic and Social Research Council, the London 
Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games had total direct revenues of £2.314 billion pounds 
consisting mainly from £971 million from sponsorships, £673 million from ticket sales and 
hospitality income, £378 million was contributed by the IOC, £111 million from a Paralympic 
subsidy, £84 million from licensing, and the rest coming from various other sources. A progress 
report from the UK Trade & Investment indicates that the 2012 London Games generated a total 
of £9.9 billion in economic benefit from Olympic-related activities (UK Trade & Investment, 
2013). Another Oxford Economics study estimates that the Games will have generated a total of 
£16.5 billion pounds in economic benefit to the UK, stemming from pre-Games construction 
activity and all economic activity during the games (Olympic.org, 2013).  The UK Trade & 
Investment Report goes so far as to claim that UK companies are winning millions of pounds in 
construction contracts for other Olympic games and £1.5 billion from Olympic-related high-
value opportunities. The report additionally goes on to say that the Olympics helped increase 
foreign inward direct investment, to the tune of 31,000 jobs added to the UK.  Between 2005 and 
2014 employment grew at a rate of +0.47% per year on average, while London’s employment 
rate grew at a rate of +2.25% during the same period. As London was already one of the leading 
first world cities, the effects on employment proved to be more modest in overall employment 
and temporary employment specifically for the Olympics. It is likely that the Olympics did 
reduce the rate of decline in manufacturing due to the number of infrastructure projects, with the 
construction industry falling 2.3% in the UK in 2012 and rising 1.5% in London.  While it is 
likely that the hosting of the Games was beneficial for employment in London,  it should be 
noted that London had a much higher growth in population during this time-period, in addition to 
most of the jobs added being in the financial services industry. During the games, a total of 
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46,000 people were employed in constructing Olympic Park and Olympic Village, according to 
Olympic.org. In addition to this, the report suggests that the 2012 Games are expected to create 
nearly 18,000 additional jobs per year between 2012-2017. This is in direct contrast to a report 
published by the Economic & Social Research Council, in addition to this, it is unlikely that 
London "bucked the trend" of a single short-term employment boost from the Olympics, 
followed by a small gain in permanent employment. This brings into question the bias of not 
only the International Olympic Committee but virtually every other pre-Games impact study that 
has been conducted, going back to the notion that pre-Games economic impact assessments are 
almost always overstated. This report from Olympic.org also claims that a significant boost in 
tourism helped lift the British economy, again, in direct contrast from the ESRC report.   
Considerable growth in the construction industry can be attributed to the largescale infrastructure 
projects London had to undertake in preparation for Games, and the growth largely ceased after 
the Olympics ended. Foreign direct investment into the United Kingdom increased significantly 
before and following the London Olympic Games from a low of £10.276 billion in 2003 to high 
of £96.81 billion in 2005 and stabilizing again at £43.273 billion following the Olympics in 
2013. However, due to the timing of the London Games, it is likely that these large fluctuations 
were due to the global economic recession in 2008, while the UK Trade & Industry reports that 
Games brought in an additional £2.5 billion inward foreign direct investment into the UK 
(ESRC, Olympic Games Impact Study – London 2012, 2015). The UK Trade & Industry report 
also accounts that the 2012 Olympics brought an additional £5.9 billion in sales and promotions 
related to the Olympics, as well as another £1.5 billion in high-value overseas contracts. While 
no studies have determined the overall effect of the Olympic Games on the GDP of London, the 
pure numbers can provide some clarity. During the quarter in which the Olympics took place in 
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London,  economists predicted GDP growth at 0.4% and it ended up being 0.6%, a net positive 
increase of +0.2% in GDP. The UK's service industry which makes up 75% of the GDP, grew at 
a rate of 1.3% during the same quarter. However, these gains were short lived and did not 
represent a sustainable solution for Britain’s financial problems. The rise in GDP was “one-off 
boost” per former British Prime Minister David Cameron. The economic benefits of the 
Olympics to London consist of brief benefits in the form of short-term employment increases, 
modest short term increases in GDP, a small increase in foreign direct investment, and Olympic 
boom to the city. 
 
 
 
Economic Costs  
 
To operate a successful 2012 Olympics, London needed new sports facilities and improved city 
services and infrastructure, which proved to be extremely costly. Pre-games total costs of hosting 
were estimated at £3 billion but quickly increased to £9 billion, before falling slightly to £8.5 
billion in July 2012 (The Olympics and Economics 2012, Goldman Sachs). Final budget 
estimates of August 2012 before put the total cost at £9.325 billion. The Oxford Olympics Study 
done in 2016 estimates that the total expenses of the London Games were £9.3 billion with a cost 
overrun of 76%, making it the costliest Summer Games in history as the final cost of the Beijing 
Games is still highly disputed. LOCOG staging expenditures totaled £2.61 billion which was 
comprised of mainly venues expenditures, technology costs, security costs, and marketing. The 
ODA (Olympic Development Authority), which was charged with the task of delivering the 
venues, infrastructure, and legacy of the 2012 Olympic London Games, reported total costs of 
£6.641 billion. More specifically, £709 million was spent on Athletes Village, £1.09 billion on 
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Olympic Park, £3.272 billion on infrastructure, £290 million on improving community sports, 
£475 million on policing and security, and the remaining amount went to public works (ESRC, 
2015). The £9.3 billion price tag was mostly funded by the Central Government of Britain who 
provided £6.25 billion in funding, another £2.18 billion coming from the national lottery, the 
Greater London Area (GLA) Olympic Precept (tax specifically for Olympic funding) afforded 
another £625 million, and the remaining £250 million was supplied the London Development 
Authority(LDA), a functional body of the GLA.  Furthermore, it is likely London experienced a 
displacement effect on their tourism industry during the months surrounding the Games. Several 
tourist attractions that regularly attract travelers saw a reduction in their visitor numbers, such as 
the Adelphi Theatre in London's West End, which received 137,000 fewer visitors in August 
2012 than they did in August 2011 (Appelbaum, 2014). Another belief is that London also 
experienced a crowding out effect as the perception among populace’ was that London would be 
overcrowded with Olympic tourists, and thus, not worth visiting during that time.  
 
Analysis and Inference  
It is too early to develop a reasonable conclusion on the economic effects of hosting the 2012 
Olympics for the city of London. London experienced an immediate positive economic impact 
from hosting through increases in consumer spending, economic output, and UK residents’ 
incomes. Additionally, London anticipates long-term economic benefits including an increase in 
jobs, growth of GDP, increase in economic output, and increases in total economic stimulus. The 
substantial effort put into revitalizing East London has led to an increase in the number of homes 
being developed through the redevelopment of Olympic Park, the construction for a new 
commercial district has begun, the unemployment rate has fallen, and infrastructure has 
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improved. Despite these successes, the final cost for the city and the UK was extremely high. 
The money used for the Olympics may have been better utilized through direct government 
intervention such as refining social programs, improving general infrastructure, or in decreasing 
the number of homeless in London. The housing developments stemming from Olympic Park 
have drifted from their original purpose of low-cost housing,  and low-income individuals are 
being priced out. Olympic stadium was sold for next to nothing to Premier League soccer club 
West Ham United for just £15 million, a massive markdown from the initial cost of £700 million, 
one of many venues either under-utilized or completely wasted after the conclusion of the 2012 
Olympics. It is too early to make any final judgment concerning the economic success of these 
Games. Only time will tell how much of increase in employment, GDP, and total economic 
output occurs vs. what is estimated. Furthermore, ongoing projects and proposals related to the 
use of Olympic venues could lead to long-term benefits for the Greater London area. 
 
 
Numbers Analysis 
When calculating the overall economic impact to a city,  it is necessary to consider the potential 
multiplier coefficients i.e. money being spent and re-spent in an area by foreign visitors, known 
as induced spending. More specifically, a multiplier coefficient represents a factor of 
proportionality that measures how much an endogenous variable change in response to a change 
in some exogenous variable. For example, suppose the Olympic games add X number of dollars 
to a bar owner Y’s profit margin, prompting the owner to hire an additional M workers. While 
money spent by Olympic Committees and the economic impact from local residents is still an 
added benefit unique to being an Olympic host, the multiplier coefficients should not be applied 
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to these sources as the money is only being recycled over and over with no real economic 
growth. This means that multiplier coefficients should only be used on those visitors whose sole 
reason for visiting was the Olympic Games. The new money supply introduced to a community 
is dispersed and represented through multiple M levels. The formula for calculating multiplier 
coefficients in place of multipliers is completed as shown:  
Direct + Indirect + Induced Effects 
Injected Visitor Expenditures  
Direct effects (M1) are the direct spending through Olympic committees, tourist spending, new 
employee salaries, etc. Indirect benefits are the second round of spending (M2) from local 
businesses and government entities that occur due to the first of direct spending. Beyond this are 
the ripple effects of the third wave of spending (M3), produced by the direct and indirect effects 
of these organizations employees spending some of their salaries and wages on different business 
in the city. This process of the third wave of spending known as induced spending is well-
depicted in Appendix C Multiplier Effect of Visitor Spending at Sports Event. These multipliers 
represent the amount of additional induced spending that occurs because of the direct and 
indirect expenditures. For example, (see Appendix), Atlanta experienced foreign visitor spending 
of $1,145,994,657 while ACOG expenditures totaled $2.6 billion meaning that the multiplier 
coefficient experienced because of Olympic expenditures is 4.4503 E.g. the direct and indirect 
expenditures induced a multiplier of 4.4503 in spending and overall economic benefit. Looking 
at each Olympics individually a pattern appears suggesting a multiplier coefficient between four 
and five for Atlanta, Sydney, and Athens — all moderately sized cities that draw usual tourist 
crowds. The multiplier analysis showed Beijing had a multiplier of 9.5573 suggesting that 
because Beijing was a less-visited tourist destination than the three cities mentioned above they 
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experienced a tourist boom that enhanced their induced spending effects. Conversely, London is 
a world-class city and one of the most visited cities in the world and experienced a multiplier 
coefficient of 1.4753, indicating that London experienced much less of an induced spending 
effect due to their already top-tier status.  
 
Overall Analysis and Inference  
Looking at the past five Summer Olympic Games in aggregate, the benefits associated with 
hosting the Olympic Games often outweigh their enormous costs to national and municipal 
governments and the opportunity costs associated with this government spending. The numerous 
challenges of hosting the Olympics create enormous expenditures that governments often fund, 
at the expense of using that money for alternatives. Determining the total economic impact from 
hosting the Olympics proves tremendously challenging due to the amount of conflicting data and 
reliability of economic impact models approximating cumulative impacts. Additionally, it is 
common for central governments to expend massive amounts of capital in preparation for the 
games, urban renewal, transportation improvements, etc. that are beneficial to the community 
and surrounding areas, and as such, should be treated as a benefit to the city. However, in place 
of spending of healthcare, education, social welfare programs, etc. an opportunity cost is always 
present when determining the economic impacts of specific actions (the use of government funds 
for Olympic-related projects vs. the use of public funds for other programs). Of the five cities 
analyzed, only Beijing could not achieve a positive net economic benefit to the city and 
surrounding areas. While the General Auditor of NSW Australia reported a negative economic 
impact to the budget of A$-1.326 billion, and the government report provided by Greek State 
estimates that the Olympics cost the city of Athens and surrounding areas 0.2% of GDP, or $-
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479,495,240, these government losses are offset by the induced economic benefits provided from 
hosting the Olympics. It is likely that Beijing was the costliest Olympics in history. However, the 
lack of proper reporting cannot corroborate this. Moreover, much of the massive Chinese 
government expenditures went towards programs and initiatives to improve environmental 
conditions, improve transportation, and create a more modern Beijing. Furthermore, while the 
economic effects to London may still be occurring, it is probable that the city will receive a 
positive net economic impact from hosting the Olympic Games.  
Many of the benefits these cities receive from hosting the Olympics, such as public works 
improvement, community development, induced spending of tourists, world recognition, among 
many others, are difficult to measure and assess their economic impact. Public works 
improvement and community development often improve areas to the point that these regions 
attract more businesses, apartment complex developers, and more investment. The tourism 
spending total is hard to establish as determining how every tourist dollar was spent is 
impossible. Additionally, the dollars brought in by tourists, increases in foreign direct 
investment, government spending, etc. all have multiplier effects that are difficult to estimate.  
Furthermore, the signaling from the global recognition as an Olympic city improves city and 
country citizen pride and can lead to long-term increases in tourism and foreign direct 
investment. However, while some benefits are difficult to measure, so are the opportunity costs 
associated with the immense government spending. Government spending can be spent on 
improving education, healthcare, social programs, and a myriad of other ‘better issues.' Though it 
is meaningless to attempt to speculate whether the government would have provided a better 
return on investment had it gone to ‘better issues.' Cities are often subject to manipulation 
through organizing committees with conflicting interests at mind. Additionally, many economic 
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impact studies are exaggerated nearly every time as those receiving the benefits fund the studies. 
Most benefits experienced by hosting the Olympics go to parties who experience microscopic to 
nothing in costs. The parties who fund Olympic impact studies are often crafty and deceitful 
businessmen and politicians: these parties will misjudge the true cost to taxpayers while 
overestimating the benefits received by the taxpayers. 
General economic impact analysis (see Appendix A) was conducted by projecting the total 
estimated positive economic impacts to the region and deducting the negative economic impacts 
to the city and surrounding area. Positive impacts were constituted by economic effects that 
positively affected the city/region such as direct Olympic Organizing Committee for Olympic 
Games spending, and the induced economic impacts such as tourism spending, increased tax 
revenues, increased foreign direct investments, and direct revenues in various forms. Negative 
effects typically only included local/central government Olympic-related spending as the 
opportunity cost generated is practically impossible to determine with accuracy. Analysis 
showed that every city except Beijing could muster a positive economic impact to the city, and 
even Beijing may have received enough in benefits to offset their massive spending. While cities 
often spend vast amounts of capital on infrastructure, transportation improvements, urban 
renewal, etc. and do not make a profit from these initiatives, the added benefits to the city are a 
direct result of that city hosting the Olympics and the government investments. 
 
Recommendations  
There are limited potential solutions for the economic issues plaguing the current Olympic 
Games hosts, however, with specific actions undertaken, Olympics hosts can receive positive 
economic impacts. One such recommendation is to revisit previous Olympic Games hosts to 
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acquire economies of scale. By using the same venues, athlete villages, among other reusable 
Olympic resources, cities can achieve economies of scale required to gain a return on these 
significant investments into infrastructure, transportation, and community development. 
Furthermore, the one-time benefits of increased tourism, induced spending, temporary 
employment boosts, temporary boosts to GDP, among others received would be experienced far 
more often with select Olympic cities increasing their positive impact. The 1996 Atlanta games 
proved to be reasonably profitable and provided a sizeable positive economic impact to Atlanta 
and the surrounding area. Furthermore, much of Atlanta’s success can be attributed to their 
massive use of corporate sponsorship and use of existing infrastructure, two more 
recommendations for future Olympic hosts. The use of standing infrastructure for athlete housing 
and either (a) using existing athletic venues or (b) utilizing athletic venues for residual revenue 
post-Olympic Games and corporate sponsorship can provide enormous sums of capital and 
financing. Additionally, those governments imposing taxes to specifically financing Olympic 
costs, creating special lotteries to raise capital, and create investment funds with the sole purpose 
of generating returns to be used on Olympic costs will fare far better than those that do not. 
Selecting one to two cities per continent would allow for these cities to achieve economies of 
scale, receive economic benefits of hosting the Olympics more often, and allow for normal 
community development. Furthermore, achieving economies of scale will allow the return on 
investment on Olympic venues to be much higher, reducing the opportunity costs. Additionally, 
select Olympic cities would eliminate the need for any new cities to spend massive amounts of 
money on hosting the Olympics, abolishing the opportunity costs experienced by the entirety of 
the country with hosting the Olympics. 
Limitations to Research 
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The limitations of this research included wavering information from sources, lack of official 
government data/biased studies, inability to apply official multipliers to input-output model in 
determining economic success of hosting, and difficulty in the judgment of what constituted a 
success in hosting the Olympics. While conducting research, it was common to discover sources 
with far different numbers representing the economic impacts and costs of hosting the Olympics. 
Additionally, many sources had wavering claims about other Olympic benefits such as tourism, 
employment, intangible benefits, and costs of hosting. The lack of post-Olympics official 
government reports and impact studies severely lacked in comparison to the number of pre-
Olympic government reports and studies. Due to the bias of those parties who receive the 
preponderance of the benefits of hosting (while also receiving the least in costs), creates a 
situation in which there are mountains of research on the benefits of hosting pre-Olympics and a 
nearly complete lack of post-Olympic research conducted by these parties.  
Furthermore, in conducting research, other Olympic economic impact studies often referenced 
the Regional Input-Output Modeling System (RIMS II) among other models in determining the 
financial success of a host city after hosting the Olympics. The RIMS II model uses multipliers 
to attempt to estimate how much a one-time or sustained increase in economic activity in a 
particular region will be supplied by industries located in the region, the model is particularly 
useful for State and Local governments to estimate regional economic impacts from events or to 
assess the impacts of tourism. The final limitation of this research was the tremendous difficulty 
of determining what composed a successful Olympic Games host. Determining success included 
not only the positive economic benefits received, the costs associated with those benefits, the 
opportunity costs, in addition to considering the intangible benefits of hosting. For example, 
while China likely spent tens of billions of dollars on the Beijing Olympics, and incurred 
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massive opportunity costs, they could achieve recognition as a global city and complete immense 
upgrades to environmental programs, infrastructure, technology development, among other 
numerous non-economic benefits.  
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Appendices: Estimated Economic Output Impact of 2012 Olympic Games  
Appendix (es) A: Multiplier Analysis  
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Appendix B: General Economic Impact Indicators  
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